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ABSTRACT  
Today, Satellite Based Augmentation Systems (SBASs) are in transition to support dual frequency Global Positioning System 
(GPS) or Galileo. With this evolution comes an architectural change, mitigating some of the time-critical requirements to 
provision SBAS data to the user. In particular dual frequency users will no longer need fast and continuous transmission of 
ionospheric corrections for the safety-of-life service. Without the need to model the ionospheric delay, future SBAS may be 
designed with a much sparser ground network and without a GEO link. 
Advanced Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (ARAIM) is a self-reliant integrity scheme that benefits from the very 
same update of GNSSs to dual frequency signals, and multiple constellations. The integrity information provided to ARAIM 
users is the Integrity Support Message (ISM) characterizing the GNSS performance with respect to integrity. ARAIM does not 
apply differential corrections like SBAS. The ISM message is provided to the user on a regular basis; however in contrast to 
GBAS or SBAS, it is significantly longer-lived and may even be provided in the form of a pre-defined dataset to be replaced 
only in a multiple-month time scale or on demand.  
This paper extends the ARAIM integrity concept so that both GNSS measurements with an ARAIM ISM and SBAS 
augmented measurements can be used in a joint position solution. It discusses improvement of user integrity availability when 
the concept is used instead of either SBAS or ARAIM alone. To illustrate the use cases for the method, we investigate on the 
trade space between current geostationary-satellite (GEO) based SBAS and the proposed online ARAIM architecture; we relate 
the architectural commonalities and differences and finally detail the proposed combination method. The operational benefit is 
demonstrated on the basis of simulated scenarios showing the Vertical Protection Level (VPL) performance of the different 
user algorithms in comparison. 
INTRODUCTION  
Both SBAS and ARAIM provide navigation integrity to GNSS users as a service. They enable applications that rely on 
positioning with strict requirements on position errors and a predictable error bound. While SBAS improves both accuracy and 
integrity by applying differential corrections, ARAIM bounds the position error computed from uncorrected range 
measurements. As a concept targeting primarily multiple-constellation the accuracy of the ARAIM position solution depends 
on a high number of available satellites in view.  
Future SBAS can benefit from the availability of dual-frequency measurements that allow the user to remove the first order 
ionospheric delay from the pseudorange measurements, resulting in less conservatism in the error models and tighter error 
bounds. Passing the responsibility of characterizing ionospheric errors from the SBAS ground segment to the user also 
removes an important architectural constraint of today’s SBAS: The short time-to-alert (TTA) requirement that is one of the 
main drivers for SBAS to use GEOs for service provision. 
Two different approaches can be seen in current SBAS roadmaps: On the one hand, U.S. Wide-Area Augmentation System 
(WAAS) is in transition to a system supporting both L1 and L5 ranging signals from the GPS constellation. The disappearance 
of the ionospheric threat allows provision of an integrity service supporting LPV-200 throughout the service volume of WAAS 
already with a single constellation. On the other hand, EGNOS as one of the more recent SBAS has always targeted 
augmentation of the European GNSS Galileo. In EGNOS V3, it is planned to support GPS and Galileo with signals on two 
frequencies by 2024 with the implementation of the V3.2 release [1].  
Both architectures have in common that the temporal structure of computing and providing SBAS corrections can be simplified 
for DF users: Ionospheric corrections are no longer needed and all other data change more slowly over time. The integrity 
function of the SBAS therefore primarily overbounds the satellite orbit and clock error distribution, and provides a fault 
detection mechanism that guarantees timely alert to the user in case of non-nominal ranging errors.  
 
 
Figure 1: Usable ranging sources (0.05th percentile) for users of ARAIM (left, ISM available for GPS and Galileo) and SBAS (right, 
only EGNOS and WAAS).  
ARAIM is an integrity concept that is yet to be implemented. Its predecessor in aviation is RAIM using single frequency GPS 
L1 measurements. The targeted operational level for ARAIM is different: In addition to providing horizontal navigation like 
RAIM it will allow GNSS measurements to be used as a primary means of navigation for vertical guidance in precision 
approach supporting the LPV-200 requirements [2]. To accomplish this vertical aspect of its service, two prerequisites have to 
be fulfilled: 1) Confidence in operational performance of the core constellations, and 2) an ARAIM ground architecture that 
can monitor the constellation performance and provide the Integrity Support Message (ISM) to ARAIM users. 
The first prerequisite is connected with the operational history of each GNSS. The objective of confirming a low enough prior 
fault probability can only be empirically reached by sufficient amount of independent observation data. The ISM provides two 
sets of parameters to overbound satellite range errors: a priori fault probabilities (𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡 and 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡) and unfaulted error bounds 
(𝜎𝑈𝑅𝐴,, 𝜎𝑈𝑅𝐸 and 𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑚). In an offline architecture, these parameters reflect the level of operational commitment that each 
constellation service provider (CSP) provides. [3, 4] design a methodology to determine the ISM parameters for GPS and 
Galileo unfaulted error bounds. 
The second prerequisite concerns the architecture that is used by the ARAIM ISM provider. Its function is to assess the core 
constellation performance in terms of nominal orbit and clock errors and signal quality. Additionally it confirms fault 
probability estimates for single satellites (Narrow Fault) or on system level (Wide Fault). Depending on the time interval 
between ISM updates and the validity period of the ISM content, different architectures can be implemented: For horizontal 
ARAIM (H-ARAIM), an architecture ingesting network data from external observation networks such as IGS/MGEX or SBAS 
reference stations can be sufficient. It provides regular confirmation on pre-defined performance parameters defined by expert 
opinion, and involves manual steps in processing the data similar to navigation performance reports available from GNSS and 
SBAS providers today [5, 6, 7]. For more stringent operations such as Vertical ARAIM (V-ARAIM) it is expected that the 
ISM has to be updated more frequently, and the performance characterization of the constellations has to be done in an 
automatic manner. Dissemination of the ISM could then be organized through any data transmission means that can provide 
updates to users every few hours. One option is to use the GNSS data payload itself for ISM delivery. From a manufacturer’s 
view it features an important advantage: There is no need for a new interface and the required architectural change at avionics 
level is little to none. 
A proposal to combine GNSS In-Band provision of ISM together with an improved navigation dataset has already been 
discussed at the ARAIM Technical Sub-Group of WG-C [8]. The concept foresees to provide a navigation overlay that would 
be used instead of the navigation information provided from the GNSS’s own ground segment. The overlay would be based on 
independent observations of the constellation and by that, improve the performance of the orbit and clock overbounds. 
Use Cases 
As mentioned before, today’s GNSS integrity services are diverse and multiple architectures target the same range of 
applications. As a consequence, different use cases are considered for the combination of ARAIM with SBAS in a unified 
integrity concept. We present three of them and demonstrate their relevance: 
1. Single-Constellation SBAS 
First, the current WAAS evolution roadmap does not foresee to include any other GNSS than GPS for SBAS augmentation. 
With the proposed combination of ARAIM and SBAS, users can improve integrity performance beyond the service that 
WAAS can provide by adding signals of other constellations with ARAIM support. In addition, robustness of the service is 
improved by reducing the impact of signal interruption or system faults. 
2. Dual/Multiple-Constellation SBAS 
EGNOS, the European SBAS, will augment Galileo and GPS in a future stage of its evolution. Our proposed concept improves 
the user integrity performance at the perimeter of the service volume, where the user receives signals from satellites that are 
not entirely monitored by the SBAS ground station network. A position solution calculated from all satellites in view, applying 
SBAS augmentation where available, results in better accuracy and integrity than a solution discarding the SBAS corrections. 
In addition, the integrity monitoring provided by SBAS can be taken into account in the integrity budget allocation of the 
underlying user algorithm. 
3. Integrity service unification to improve architectural degrees of freedom during service transition 
The third use case concerns longer term evolutions of SBAS, where we assume that certain economic drivers exist to phase out 
the use of geostationary links for dissemination. Instead, the data transmission capability of the core GNSS or other satellite 
systems may be used. GEO links have been chosen as the SBAS dissemination means for two technical reasons: Bandwidth 
and low latency. The bandwidth requirement for the dual frequency service is significantly lowered because no fast-changing 
ionosphere parameters have to be transmitted.  The technical challenge in this transition however is the rapid integrity alerting 
functionality that SBAS provides in case of a fault. The current architecture relies on a low-latency channel to the airborne user 
through continuous reception of the GEO signal. The proposed concept mitigates the timing requirement on the SBAS Ground 
Segment side by providing this integrity barrier in the user receiver with ARAIM. 
The improvement is a facilitation of the transition: User receivers that support the combined use of SBAS and ARAIM 
integrity will be able to seamlessly adapt to such changes and always work at optimal performance. Development and 
deployment cycles of avionics hardware can thus be decoupled from evolution steps of GNSS and SBAS. In the next section, 
the proposed new method is detailed and justified. 
METHOD 
The proposed combination of ARAIM and SBAS is based on the Multiple Hypothesis Solution Separation (MHSS) algorithm 
first introduced in [9]. This algorithm is adapted to plug in both the GNSS ranging measurements protected by an ISM and 
those augmented by SBAS. In this section, we detail the baseline ARAIM and SBAS integrity equations and the combination 
method. We describe the steps taken to accomplish the combination: Starting with the baseline MHSS algorithm we include 
SBAS measurements, adjust the error model to augmented ranging as provided by SBAS, and discuss the impact on the 
hypothesis tree and integrity performance. 
In the subsequent section the new methodology is applied to a simulation that demonstrates the operational benefit of the 
proposed combination. We limit this analysis to the Vertical Protection Level (VPL) which is a common requirement of both 
SBAS and ARAIM.  
MHSS Vertical Protection Level 
MHSS is the user algorithm used in the ARAIM integrity concept. It provides two integrity functions: Overbounding of the 
nominal position error, and fault detection. Differently to Weighted Least Squares RAIM [10] no decision on the estimated 
fault state of one or more satellites is taken; instead it concurrently takes into account all mutually exclusive combinations of 
faulted and un-faulted satellites. Each of these unique combinations is a fault hypothesis, and its corresponding position 
solution can be computed from the subset of un-faulted satellites in that hypothesis. MHSS then combines multiple position 
solutions and computes an error bound that encloses the true position as long as one of the considered hypotheses is correct. 
The selection of hypotheses to be computed within MHSS is made such that the probability of the correct hypothesis being 
among those not computed is below a fraction of the available integrity budget. 
MHSS relies on the provision of an Integrity Support Message (ISM) that contains information on the GNSS constellation 
performance as defined in Table 1. These parameters allow the receiver to compute 𝜎𝑈𝑅𝐴,𝑖  , 𝜎𝑈𝑅𝐸,𝑖 , 𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑚,𝑖  and 𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡,𝑖 for each 
satellite i; and 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡,𝑗 for each constellation j [2]. 
In the following equations we define the following nomenclature: Definitions relating to hypothesis k have the hypothesis index 
in parantheses as a superscript, e.g. subset geometry  𝑮(𝑘). Quantities relating to a satellite i have a subscript index, e.g. the 
standard deviation of the i
th
 satellite pseudorange error distribution 𝜎𝑖. Similarly we denote constellation related quantities 
with a subscript j. 
Table 1: ISM Parameters [2] 
Identifier Description 
𝜎𝑈𝑅𝐴,𝑖 Standard deviation of clock and ephemeris error overbound of satellite i 
𝜎𝑈𝑅𝐸,𝑖 Standard deviation of clock and ephemeris error of satellite i used for accuracy and continuity 
𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑚,𝑖   Maximum nominal bias for satellite i used for integrity 
𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡,𝑖 Prior probability of a satellite fault, Satellite i, per approach 
𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡,𝑗 Prior probability of a fault affecting multiple satellites in constellation j per approach 
 
This dataset allows MHSS to perform three functions [11]: 
 Selection of the fault hypotheses to be taken into account for computation of the subset solutions 
 Computation of the error bounds for each subset solution and the solution separation  
 Fault detection and exclusion (FDE) for single or multiple satellite faults 
The first function is the selection of fault hypotheses to be monitored for faults by MHSS. It assigns each satellite a binary fault 
state: Either the satellite is within or outside its nominal specifications. If its state is “non-faulty”, the nominal performance 
parameters  𝜎𝑈𝑅𝐴,𝑖 , 𝜎𝑈𝑅𝐸,𝑖, and  𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑚,𝑖 correctly describe the true range error distribution of the satellite signal received at the 
user. If its state is faulty, the user range error is arbitrary and any navigation solution including this satellite may result in a 
position error outside the admissible error bound. 
The total number of fault hypotheses using a geometry size of N satellites is  2𝑁 and MHSS needs to select which of the fault 
hypotheses it has to include in the computation of the integrity equations. For a given hypothesis k with a set 𝑺(𝑘) indexing 
satellites in fault state, we can assign a prior probability derived from the individual satellite fault probabilities 
 𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟
(𝑘)
= ∏ 𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡,𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑺(𝑘) ∏ 1 − 𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡,𝑖𝑖 ∉ 𝑺(𝑘)  (1) 
With a 𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡
𝑖 ≪ 1  (a typical value is 𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡
𝑖 = 1𝑥105), hypotheses containing multiple satellites in 𝑺(𝑘) have a very low prior 
probability. The selection of hypotheses not to be considered is made such that their sum probability is only a fraction of the 
allocated integrity risk 𝑃𝐻𝑀𝐼 . It is then acceptable to leave these subsets un-monitored. All remaining subsets are included in 
the computation of a position solution together with a protection level, so that the true position lies within the protection level 
at a probability of 1 − 𝑃𝐻𝑀𝐼 .  
The second function of MHSS is the computation of the error bounds (Protection Level) for each of the subset geometries. The 
error bound is an error propagation of nominal distributions of the smoothed pseudorange measurement errors, worst case 
combinations of ranging biases at the user level, and a solution separation term modeling the accuracy of the fault monitors 
built into ARAIM.  
The nominal smoothed pseudorange error is overbounded by a Gaussian distribution: 
 𝜎𝑖
2 = 𝜎𝑈𝑅𝐴,𝑖
2 + 𝜎𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜,𝑖
2 + 𝜎𝑐𝑛𝑚𝑝,𝑖
2   ,  (2) 
where 𝜎𝑈𝑅𝐴,𝑖
2  denotes the overbound of satellite orbit and clock errors projected into the worst-case user line-of sight, 𝜎𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜,𝑖
2  is 
the worst case tropospheric residual error overbound after applying the tropospheric error model and 𝜎𝑐𝑛𝑚𝑝,𝑖
2   denotes the 
multipath and tracking noise at user level for an airborne user [12]. 
The vertical projection of the combination of nominal errors from all satellites in (k), using the geometry 𝑮(𝑘) and weighting 
matrix 𝑾(𝑘), is then 
 (𝜎𝑣
(𝑘)
)
2
= |(𝑮(𝑘)
𝑇
𝑾(𝑘)𝑮(𝑘))
−1
|
3,3
 (3) 
The Gaussian overbound of the nominal position error in one of the position axes allows to quantify an upper bound on the 
probability that the error is above a certain threshold. Its inverse tail distribution function is used to compute an inflation factor 
related to the assigned integrity risk, 
 𝐾𝑣
(𝑘)
= 𝑄−1(𝑃𝐻𝑀𝐼
(𝑘)
)   . (4) 
Biases caused by nominal signal deformation or phase center variations of transmit and receive antenna are modeled with a 
bias 𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑚,𝑖 . ISM provides this bias magnitude to describe the minimum bias that could be observed by the ARAIM monitoring 
network, and consequently the user must assume this maximum bias magnitude to be present when computing the error bound. 
Moreover, the orientation of the biases in each of the satellite ranging measurements is unknown and as such they are aligned 
such as to generate the maximum impact in each direction of the local coordinate system. With the projection matrix 𝑆 =
(𝐺𝑇𝑊𝐺)−1𝐺𝑇𝑊 derived from the Geometry G and the Weighting Matrix W, the worst-case combination of biases in the 
vertical axis is 
 𝑏𝑣 = ∑ |𝑺|3,𝑖 ⋅ 𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑚,𝑖  .𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖  (5) 
In the above equation we have left out the index denoting the subset (k) for clarity. 
The last term contributing to the error bound is the solution separation for each subset. It accounts for the sensitivity of the 
solution separation test and is defined as 
 𝑇𝑣
(𝑘)
= 𝐾𝑓𝑎,𝑣
(𝑘)
 𝜎𝑠𝑠,𝑣
(𝑘)
  ,  (6) 
where the distribution of the solution separation is computed from the projection of the covariance into the vertical axis, 
 𝜎𝑖,𝑠𝑠,3 = 𝒆3
𝑇(𝑺𝑖 − 𝑺0)𝑪𝑎𝑐𝑐(𝑺
𝑖 − 𝑺0)𝑇𝒆𝟑  .  (7) 
The inflation factor 𝐾𝑓𝑎,𝑖 corresponds with the partial continuity risk allocated to each test. 
The three contributions to the VPL for each hypothesis (𝑘) can be written together as 
 𝑉𝑃𝐿(𝑘) = 𝐾𝑣
(𝑘)
𝜎𝑣
(𝑘)
+ ∑ |𝑺(𝑘)|3,𝑖 ⋅ 𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑚,𝑖  𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖 𝑖𝑛 (𝑘) + 𝑇𝑣
(𝑘)
 (8) 
Each partial VPL can be adjusted through the allocation of integrity risk for this hypothesis. The solution VPL is defined by 
 𝑃𝐻𝑀𝐼 ≥  2𝑄 (
𝑉𝑃𝐿−𝑏𝑣
(0)
𝜎𝑣
(0) ) + ∑ 𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟
(𝑘)
⋅ 𝑄 (
𝑉𝑃𝐿−𝑏𝑣
(𝑘)
−𝑇𝑣
(𝑘)
𝜎𝑣
(𝑘) )𝑘=1..𝑁 + 𝑃𝑢𝑛𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑  (9) 
A detailed description of the reference algorithm is described in [11] and the ARAIM Algorithm Definition Document 
appended to the WG-C Milestone 3 report [2]. Relating to the present work we can see a similarity with SBAS protection level 
computation which is presented in the subsequent paragraph. 
SBAS Vertical Protection Level 
In this paragraph we review the Dual Frequency SBAS VPL equations currently under finalization in EUROCAE WG-62’s 
Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Galileo / GPS / SBAS Airborne Equipment [13]. The error of the 
smoothed, corrected pseudorange measurements can be overbounded with 
 𝜎𝑖,𝐷𝐹𝑆𝐵𝐴𝑆
2 = 𝜎𝐷𝐹𝐶,𝑖
2 + 𝜎𝑈𝐼𝑅𝐸,𝑖
2 + 𝜎𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜,𝑖
2 + 𝜎𝑎𝑖𝑟,𝑖
2   .  (10) 
Two of the terms in this equation have already been introduced in the ARAIM equations: 𝜎𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜,𝑖
2   and 𝜎𝑎𝑖𝑟,𝑖
2  overbound the 
residual tropospheric error and the airborne multipath and tracking noise for smoothed measurements. Those errors are 
uncorrelated between different users and thus cannot be corrected by SBAS. 
𝜎𝐷𝐹𝐶,𝑖
2  is the model variance for the residual error associated to SBAS corrections ([13], A.3) and is computed from the SBAS 
Dual Frequency Ranging Error Indicator (DFREI) 𝜎𝐷𝐹𝑅𝐸 , the user location factor 𝛿𝐷𝐹𝑅𝐸 and the degradation parameters 𝜀𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 
and 𝜀𝑒𝑟. The user ionospheric residual error, i.e. higher-order ionospheric delay that cannot be corrected by the dual frequency 
linear combination, is modeled as 
 𝜎𝑈𝐼𝑅𝐸 =
40
261+(𝐸𝑙[𝑑𝑒𝑔])
2 + 0.018 [𝑚]  (11) 
This is an elevation dependent function that, for satellites at elevations above 2 degrees, results in a maximum error of ~17 cm 
(Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Ionospheric Residual Uncertainty for Dual Frequency SBAS [13] 
The VPL for an SBAS augmented position solution can be computed from 
 𝑉𝑃𝐿𝐷𝐹𝑆𝐵𝐴𝑆 = 𝐾𝑣,𝑆𝐵𝐴𝑆 ⋅ 𝜎𝑣 (12) 
with the covariance matrix defined from the vector of satellite ranging error standard deviations 
 𝑾 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔
(
 
 1
𝝈𝒊,𝑫𝑭𝑺𝑩𝑨𝑺
𝟐⁄
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 (13) 
and, assuming uncorrelated measurement errors, the position covariance defined by the two-constellation geometry matrix and 
the ranging covariance 
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= (𝑮𝑇 ⋅ 𝑾 ⋅ 𝑮)−1 (14) 
The inflation factor 𝐾𝑣,𝑆𝐵𝐴𝑆 = 5.33 corresponds with a two-sided tail probability  𝑃𝐻𝑀𝐼 = 2 ⋅ 𝑄(5.33) ≈ 10
−7. 
Consolidation of ARAIM and SBAS Protection Level Equations 
The protection level equations presented in the previous section on MHSS and SBAS have obvious commonalities when it is 
considered that SBAS provides an integrity barrier against faulted satellites already on system level; i.e. the range 
measurements in the SBAS geometry can always be considered fault-free. The proposed method uses the MHSS integrity 
equations together with an adaptation of the error model in case of SBAS corrected measurements. It is shown that the 
resulting MHSS protection level converges with the SBAS protection level under a set of assumptions. With this identity we 
can exchange the SBAS equations with the MHSS equations for geometries fully augmented by SBAS, but moreover it is 
possible to combine satellite pseudoranges with and without SBAS augmentation into a joint geometry with a valid protection 
level equation. We illustrate this consolidation in the following under the assumption that all visible satellites are augmented 
by SBAS. In that case, the integrity equation becomes ident with the SBAS equation. 
The first adaptation relates to the prior fault probability of satellites with SBAS augmentation available. Assuming the prior 
fault probability 𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡.𝑆𝐵𝐴𝑆
𝑖 = 0  ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝐵𝐴𝑆, the MHSS set of hypotheses reduces to the fault-free hypothesis. The VPL 
equation is then 
 𝑉𝑃𝐿𝑀𝐻𝑆𝑆,𝑆𝐵𝐴𝑆 = 𝐾
(0)𝜎𝑣
(0)
+ ∑ |𝑆|3,𝑖𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑚,𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖  (15) 
Because no integrity budget has to be allocated into fault hypotheses the inflation factor used on the Gaussian overbound can 
be set to the full integrity budget  
 𝐾(0) = 𝑄−1(0.5 ⋅ 𝑃𝐻𝑀𝐼) = 5.33  (16) 
for 𝑃𝐻𝑀𝐼 = 10
−7 (for simplicity we assume no allocation to horizontal integrity in this work). 
A similar adaptation can be made for constellation faults. Satellites with SBAS augmentation are considered monitored against 
constellation faults and are not excluded in the constellation fault hypothesis of the constellation they belong to. If all satellites 
of a given constellation are processed with SBAS, the user receiver can deselect the constellation fault hypothesis and leave it 
unmonitored. 
The second adaptation relates to the nominal bias term introduced in equation (5). Nominal GNSS signal deformation causes 
measurement biases at the receiver level, and the bias magnitude depends on the receiver configuration, i.e. RF bandwidth, 
correlator types and the correlator spacing. In ARAIM the nominal magnitude of such biases is described with the 𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑚 
parameter and is conservatively added among all satellites contributing to the position solution. 
SBAS provides differential corrections determined from a network of precise reference stations operated in a controlled 
environment, and biases impacting aviation users are observed also at the reference stations. The differential corrections 
therefore include ranging errors introduced by such biases. Consequently, the nominal integrity bias can be neglected in the 
VPL equation for all satellites corrected by SBAS. For a fully augmented geometry, the VPL equation is now reduced to 
 𝑉𝑃𝐿𝑀𝐻𝑆𝑆,𝑆𝐵𝐴𝑆
∗ = 𝐾(0)𝜎𝑣
(0)
.  (17) 
The form of equation (17) is now identical with the SBAS VPL equation (12). The error model behind 𝜎𝑣
(0)
 can now be 
adjusted to overbound the range error ofa differentially corrected pseudorange. From Equation (NN) it follows that the satellite 
orbit and clock errors can be overbounded in the SBAS case by 𝜎𝐷𝐹𝐶,𝑖
2 . In addition we include a residual ionospheric error 
𝜎𝑈𝐼𝑅𝐸,𝑖
2  that currently has no equivalent in the MHSS error model. 
The third adaptation is therefore an adjustment of the nominal error overbound for satellites corrected with SBAS. In the 
case of an SBAS-only geometry we have 
 𝜎𝑖,𝑆𝐵𝐴𝑆
2 = 𝜎𝐷𝐹𝐶,𝑖
2 + 𝜎𝑈𝐼𝑅𝐸,𝑖
2 + 𝜎𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜,𝑖
2 + 𝜎𝑎𝑖𝑟,𝑖
2   ∀𝑖 (18) 
and the VPL computed with the MHSS algorithm matches the one computed with the SBAS Dual Frequency equations. 
RESULTS 
This section revisits the use cases introduced above and presents simulation results that confirm the suggested improvements. 
In our simulation, the Stanford GPS Lab’s MatLab Algorithm Availability Simulation Tool [14] was used to compute the user 
geometries both for ARAIM and for the comparative SBAS case. Nominal constellations consisting of 24 GPS and 24 Galileo 
satellites were simulated during a ten day period to ensure full geometric diversity. A user grid of 5 by 5 degrees spacing 
defines the service volume. The summary of the simulation parameters is reproduced in Table 2 for the first two use cases 
(WAAS and EGNOS scenarios). 
Table 2: Simulation parameters 
Parameter UC1  UC2 
GNSS Constellations Nominal 24 GPS+24 Galileo 
SBAS G/S 38 WRS 41 RIMS 
SBAS S/S 3 GEOs (SM-9, CRW, CRE) 2 GEOs (5B, SES-5) 
SBAS scope GPS only / Dual Frequency GPS + Galileo / Dual Frequency 
SBAS UDRE model constant 
ARAIM URA 1.5m 
SBAS URE 1.0 m 
𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑚  0.75 m 
𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡  10
−5 
𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 10
−8 
Duration 10 d 
Time interval 15 min 
User grid 5x5 deg 
𝑃𝐻𝑀𝐼  9.8 ⋅ 10
−8 Vert. / 2 ⋅ 10−9 Horiz. 
PA Mode (SBAS) enabled 
 
Here the simulated SBAS applies a heavily simplified model to determine the availability of the SBAS correction for a given 
user and satellite, and the computation of the UDRE. The SBAS augmentation is considered available when the satellite has 
been in view of the SBAS reference stations for a given time, and any of the SBAS GEOs is in view of the user. The resulting 
performance level is thus not representative w.r.t. the targeted performance levels of the future DF SBAS. However this 
simplified model is sufficient to demonstrate the comparison of the SBAS equations with the MHSS equations adapted to 
include SBAS. 
Single Constellation SBAS 
The first use case demonstrated by simulation is the Single Constellation (SC) SBAS. In our example we simulate a simplified 
DF WAAS with three GEOs. In this scenario, WAAS provides only augmentation for GPS satellites while Galileo integrity is 
available using an ISM and ARAIM. 
In Figure 3, a comparison of the 0.995 quantiles of standard ARAIM VPL (left) and SBAS VPL (right) lets us observe that 
augmentation of only a single constellation already results in a significantly higher integrity performance. It increases even 
more if SBAS measurements are used together with ARAIM (middle) and the user can process measurements from all 
satellites in view. This can be seen from the area within the footprint of the GEOs where the combined performance 
outperforms the single constellation SBAS. 
   
Figure 3: VPL performance with a combination of Single Constellation SBAS (e.g. WAAS) and Dual Constellation ARAIM 
It is emphasized that the absolute performance levels of all three results are a function of the assumptions and should not be 
read as an estimate of the actual performance of the three services.  
Dual Constellation SBAS 
In the second use case we simulate the EGNOS SBAS as an exemplary dual-frequency, dual constellation (DFDC) 
augmentation system. In this scenario, users can always process both GPS and Galileo satellites with augmentation within the 
SBAS service volume. The performance gap between ARAIM and DFDC SBAS is therefore significantly higher. A 
combination of the SBAS augmentation with the MHSS user algorithm therefore does not result in a better performance in any 
of the simulated geometries (Figure 4). However an operational advantage is that a single integrity algorithm now provides the 
optimal performance at all locations, irrespective of the availability of the SBAS augmentation. This seamless service can be 
an operational advantage even more within the Service Volume if it helps improving continuity if the SBAS service is 
interrupted unexpectedly, e.g. by terrain. 
   
Figure 4: VPL Performance with a combination of a Dual Frequency SBAS (e.g. EGNOS V3) and ARAIM 
Integrity service unification for service transition 
A third use case was previously described regarding the architectural choices in transitioning to future evolutions of SBAS. 
Today SBAS provides fast corrections and integrity information through a GEO, but different architectures might be desirable 
in the future. For example, SBAS corrections and nominal integrity models could be provided through a dissemination channel 
with higher latency, e.g. as part of the GNSS navigation payload. Both these data are strongly correlated over time and need 
less update rate than a GEO can provide. If this transition is implemented however the fast integrity flagging mechanism is no 
more available, and fault detection would be in the responsibility of the user. 
The proposed MHSS based algorithm could implement such a function with a minimal change in the error model assumptions: 
While the nominal error model parameters provided by SBAS are applied together with the corrections, it is no longer 
acceptable to assume fault-free satellites. Consequently the satellite fault probability would be non-zero and we re-introduce 
fault hypotheses, but using the SBAS nominal error models for the satellites. Depending on the monitoring function provided 
by SBAS, this 𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡,𝑆𝐵𝐴𝑆 could be different from the 𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡  provided by ISM. 
We illustrate this use case by an example of a system including an SBAS and an ISM valid for both constellations. In Figure 5 
the left plot shows again the unified MHSS approach when a DFDC SBAS is available and provides monitoring of the 
satellites. In the right plot, the FDE function of the SBAS is not available and we assume a 𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡,𝑆𝐵𝐴𝑆 = 10
−5 per approach for 
the satellites. Still the measurements can be differentially corrected and the nominal biases are set to zero. The interesting 
result in this analysis is that the performance decrease is minimal, but the architectural change is significant: The right scenario 
could be operated without a GEO if the SBAS data would be transmitted e.g. through the GNSS navigation bits.  
  
Figure 5: VPL Performance combining SBAS without fault detection and ARAIM. For demonstration purposes both scenarios 
assume a GEO present to convey the SBAS information to the users, and the same RIMS network. In the plot on the left, SBAS G/S 
provides fault monitoring to the user. In the plot on the right, fault detection is performed by the user and a prior probability of 10-5 
per approach per satellite is assumed both for ISM and for SBAS.  
In this scenario it can be observed that the performance in the southern half of the GEO footprint becomes worse than ARAIM with 
ISM when the differential corrections and their overbonding are used, but fault detection remains within the user algorithm. The 
cause is the simplified UDRE model in this simulation. In a real SBAS scenario the effect would be similar, since the UDRE outside 
the reference station can be higher than a globally provided URA from ISM. In such a combined mode, MHSS could choose between 
ISM and SBAS overbounding based on best performance. 
DISCUSSION 
In the previous sections the method of a combined, unified integrity service based on MHSS has been introduced and several 
use cases have been confirmed by means of simulation. The present work is only an initial take on an integrity service outside 
the existing paradigms of SBAS or ARAIM. Two relevant aspects of implementation, both technical and of governance nature 
are discussed below. 
Liability and institutional assignment of the unified service 
Provision of integrity services is not only a technical challenge – aviation operators use a service based on standards, 
regulations and legislation applicable both to an operator and/or a particular airspace. Having an integrity service depend on 
multiple secondary systems dilutes liability and may be unacceptable for the airspace authority.  
A mechanism allowing an operator of one of the sub-services (ISM or SBAS) to govern usage of such a combined approach 
can be established if the user is mandated to check for a “use flag” in the corresponding data. As an example, WAAS could 
provide a flag related to the use of Galileo with an ISM coming from a third party provider. WAAS ground segment could then 
monitor the performance and disable ISM (and thus, combined ARAIM/SBAS use) in their service volume if necessary. 
Clock states 
ARAIM users solve the position equation including a user clock offset to one or multiple GNSS constellations. SBAS users 
solve the position equation with a clock offset relating to the SBAS system time. If users want to include both SBAS and non-
SBAS ranges in their solution it must be assumed that the SBAS corrected measurements reference a different clock than the 
stand-alone measurements. Additional clock states can be included in the design matrix but will reduce the degree of over-
determination of the linearized system of equations. This entails that the performance in mixed geometries will be slightly 
degraded if additional clock states are computed.  
CONCLUSION 
This paper introduced a novel integrity mechanism that aims to unify the user-level algorithm for SBAS based integrity and 
ARAIM based integrity. It demonstrated along three use cases that the user integrity performance can be improved and 
operational benefits regarding continuity can be achieved. Finally, the proposed combination allows architectural changes in 
the future such as a partial transition of integrity functions from SBAS to the user level, such as the fault detection function 
which currently depends on the use of GEOs. 
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